Late his life, McKinley Reconsidering protectionism. It was reformulated in 1900, and by its second administration, he felt that the United States should receive globalization by entering foreign markets. “Isolation is no longer possible or desirable.” This will be the last. Chulgos shot it the next day. However, the man of the tariff man died.
McKinley was sometimes welcomed as “the architect of the American century”, a biography of his biography, Robert W. Miri. McKinley’s strategic future was not very bold, though, that was very narrow. The national defense is largely on the day of Machinley to prevent invasions – an unexpected task, given the peaceful neighbors in the country and the oceanic trenches. In 1890, in the year in which the Kinnnley’s Kinnnley’s tariff sent panic, stood to the battles, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had only sixty -seven employees in Washington. Most of them were scribes, who divided their duties alphabetically instead of the area-one of them imagined the Canadian affairs that are being dealt with by the Bulgarian office.
Other than things, ultimately, McKinley’s speech was not in Boufalo but the Second World War, which attracted American leaders to adopt a much wider vision of the national interest. Andrew Preston, a historian at the University of Virginia (and knowledgeable), describes the shift in his new studied book, ”Total defense(Harvard). The key, says Preston, was reshaping the risks. After the war, high -ranking officials talked about defense and more than security, an expansion concept that goes beyond the protection of borders. Diplomacy, intelligence and external aid.
This new position was out of intuition. When World War II began, it spread in Europe and Asia, but it seemed unlikely to touch the neighboring United States. “Panzer tanks were not about to roll through Washington, DC,” the historian Stephen Vertahim writes. The first American committee, which had about four hundred and fifty chapters and branches at its peak, insisted that the country should remain outside the distant war.
Even after December 7, 1941, when Japan attacked some of the lands called McKinley – Hawaii, the Philippines, and Gamam – they did not necessarily see Kansas or California any reason for the uniform. Marshall was worried. Hollywood director Frank Kabra rented motivational films. The seven-film documentary series, “Wh-We Kight” (1942-1945), is now classic, but Preston indicates how strange. There was no need to tell people in France, China, the Soviet Union and Britain about the reason for their fighting. Only in the neighboring United States, citizens need high budget films to understand a series of events in which the war might endanger their homes.
The presidents are required of a guardianship, too. “I don’t know anything about foreign affairs,” Harry S. admitted. Truman, after the death of President Franklin Dylano Roosevelt, in April 1945, was unexpectedly cleared in the Oval Office. To reach the speed, Truman made repeated trips to the White House map room, where the Admiral William de Leesy taught him. Truman Pored Over Files, takes papers full of home bags, and read a lot to the point that he is afraid to destroy his vision permanently. The image that appeared in front of his tense eyes from the United States was a student in the world, with rules, allies and interests covering the world. It was “the strongest nation, perhaps, in all history.”
Strong, but she was at risk. “We must maintain our superiority on the ground and the sea unabated,” Truman insisted. This was not just a military issue. National Security declared “much broader basis,” as announced in the 1947 case speech. It was based on prices, agriculture, information, and human freedoms. This was a new concept of security, universally in its range and very expanded in its content, where Breston notes, “It can include almost anything.”
Certainly, the trade included. Many believed that economic barriers had caused war in the first place. As long as the rising forces like Japan and Germany felt that their only way to secure critical resources such as rubber, charcoal and oil was invading their neighbors, the world will never be safe. If the United States can use its wide power to open commercial doors, those countries themselves will choose to trade instead of opening. It was the prosperity of the carrot. The American army, in addition to those of its allies, was the stick.
Any president trying to organize a global system like the output during the sect of sect would face a capitalist revolution. But after the Second World War, with the bombing of their competitors literally abroad, American manufacturers did not have any reason for the objection. Reducing the American customs tariff will urge other countries to reduce it, providing an opening for American companies. It also gave foreigners an opportunity to earn dollars, which they used to buy American goods. Openness provided clear benefits that Ford president himself prompted the tariff for imported cars.
Liberal internationalism decisively means trading with previous enemies. The United States had led to the tissues of Japan and Napalmed, but then promoted the Japanese economy seriously. Washington extended military protection and used a diplomatic crane to open the markets of other countries to Japanese exports. During the Korean war, the Pentagon spent hundreds of millions of dollars annually on Japanese goods and services. The Japanese Prime Minister described the war as a “gift from the gods.” The head of the non -car manufacturer, Toyota, described military purchases as “salvation” for his company.
Under the American Eagle Pavilion, the Japanese economy grew more than fifty times in the three decades that followed World War II. From Vantage in the White House, this was a reason to celebrate, not alert. Her previous enemy was a prosperous ally, and Japan’s manufacturers have formed a little threat. John Foster Dallas, International Secretary of State Eisenhower, told the Japanese Prime Minister (according to an official summary of the meeting), “The Japanese do not make the things we want.”
A procession of presidents insisted that the liberal international was profitable to the two sides-the United States existed for the world. Other people have canceled. In its design to be surrounded by free trade allies, the United States has not accurately kept itself. During the Cold War, it faced the threat of socialism with a coup and the carpet. In the years after that, it seeks to eliminate terrorism in the Middle East. Even her close allies complained about her excessive power. Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau told Washington fans in 1969: “Living next to you is like sleeping with an elephant,” regardless of being friendly and familiar with the monster, if he has called it, one of them is affected by all nullification and blocking. “
There is no fun to be the elephant bed colleague, definitely. But is it really great to be the elephant? Global aspirations attracted the United States into meaningless wars, drained their treasures, and building their competitors, as critics claimed. As for a specific tape of the critic, the problem of the liberal internationalism is not aggressive for it, but it is its charity. It supports foreigners at the expense of citizens.
This objection gained strength with the emergence of Japan. There was an extension between the seventies of the seventies of the last century and in the 1990s when Japan, by that time, seemed the second largest economy in the world, ready to overcome the United States as the first. In 1980, Japanese fuel imports formed a quarter of cars sold on the American market. Hundreds of thousands of workers in the American auto industry lost their jobs that year.
The progress of Japan on the New York horizon. Mitsubishi bought the Rockefeller Center. The Japanese construction company AOKI has become a co -owner of the famous Plaza Hotel; Japanese angers, Hideki Yokoi, acquired the Empire State building. Will the Japanese, like the Hammameds, take Manhattan? The nationalists installed their hopes on a dominant local investor with the taste of long buildings: Donald Trump. The scene (my country “has bought the Mona Lisa”) from Oki and gained a stake in the Empire building in Yukoy. Journalist C Japan buys the Church of St. Peter; Trump buys the Moscow circus; Japan buys the Kennedy Center. “
In fact, the historian Jennifer M. Miller, Trump was treated with Japan more complicated. Japanese businessmen filled with casinos, bought his apartments, and loaned money. They did not like, though. On a trip to Tokyo in 1990, according to correspondent Harry Hert III, Trump rejected the local dining experience. (“I will not eat any fucking raw fish.”) He stormed an official dinner with Japanese bankers at his first night and rarely eating until McDonald’s found the next afternoon. He called for the Emperor’s vision, but the spokesman for the Emperor had no idea of Trump.
Trump took Japan’s success as a betrayal. After eating with the editor, Abi Rosental and a gay writer, he remembered that he shocked him through their references to “the feeling of sovereignty that the country had in the fifties of the last century”-the feeling that Trump was born too late to enjoy fully. “Since the Vietnam War, and even before, this country was not superior to,” Trump said. It was because Japan and the other US allies “tear the left, right, and below the center.”
