In December, the German government-a coalition led by Social Democrats at Olaf Schuls-hit a vote without confidence. The elections will be held next month. Schools came to power after a sixteen years Angela MerkelBut it became unpopular among a stagnant economy – the pride that was one day, if not exactly, was the continent. The favorite of the elections is the Christian Democratic Union in the right of An alternative to Germany (AFD) grows in the east of the country. ((Elon Musk She made news recently, and attracted the disdain of Schulz, saying that he hoped that the popular AFD, which is defined above all through her strong hostility to immigrants, in the elections) CDU, including social democrats.
To better understand the situation of German policy, I recently spoke on the phone with Hans Condenani, the author of multiple books on the country, and former president of the Europe program in Chatham House, a British research center. During our conversation, which was edited for length and clarity, we discussed how Merkel’s legacy, which one day excelled, had put behind her failure, and how the German extremist right differs from its European counterparts, and whether the lack of the dispute between the main political parties in Germany is a threat For its democracy.
What do you see as central political problems in Germany? Do you see these things as only, compared to other countries that suffer from political instability?
What you have in German policy is a permanent great coalition. When Angela Merkel became a consultant, in 2005, there was only a major alliance in the history of the Federal Republic. Since then, the major coalitions have become the base. It led a large alliance of three of its four periods in his position. During the reign of Schulz, we had this alleged “Light Light” coalition, and it is not technically a great alliance because it does not include Christian Democrats, but it is a great functional alliance. This is partially related to the way it includes parties from all over the political spectrum. You have social democrats in the left center, you have vegetables, who at least in some issues are a left -wing party, but then you have the free democrats, a large right -wing party.
But there is a consensus in the German policy center that agrees with all parties that may be in the government on almost everything. The differences are really very simple, and they are completely different from the United States. So I am thinking about the government of Schulz, Kasal, about the consensus of Merkel. In the last elections, three years ago, the two main candidates – Schulz, who was the socialist democratic candidate of the consultant, and Aren Lasht, who was the Christian democratic candidate – was mainly competing with each other to persuade the German people that they were more like Merkel from their opponent. Since Schools became a consultant, the war in Ukraine forced him to shift in some things, especially about the need to spend more on defense and search for alternative sources of energy.
Even if Germany is completely distinguished in the form of the existing consensus, it is also correct that voters elsewhere in Europe and the United States are not satisfied with the current governments.
I think that the anti -surprise mood that you are talking about is in response to the failure of the middle governments in providing solutions to citizens for their problems. France is a good example, as it increases the far right, in particular, stronger and stronger, and this forces the middle parties to close the ranks and join the extreme. This is how much Emmanuel Macron He presented himself when he ran for the first time to the French presidency. But then this means that they do not have a program that provides citizens a lot, then the extremist right becomes stronger. I think there is a copy of those that happen in Germany.
Do you think Merkel’s sixteen years are responsible for the failure of this current government, in the sense of the decisions it made and its impact? I am thinking of the initiative to approach Russia, reject the DNA, and immigration, everything you think about the moral weight of its decision on the acceptance of refugees?
I think Merkel was an absolute disaster for Germany in every possible way, and I mentioned some of the ways in which it was a catastrophic of Germany. There is another dimension for this, often discusses, which is that something is hostile to democracy around Merkel. AFD is a response to the “no alternative” policy. Even their name was a response to Merkel’s assertion that there was no alternative to her approach to the euro crisis.
It is important to emphasize that it was consensus, therefore, somehow, it is not fair to blame Merkel. Merkel was just an expression of this consensus, and this brings me back to the point about major alliances. In all these decisions, whether it is economic policy decisions-therefore, for example, we can talk about the debt brakes-or whether foreign decisions such as the German approach to China and Russia were not just pushing Merkel through; This was a consensus in German policy that included social democrats.
Can you talk about debt brake?
The debt brake was this maximum government debt and the deficit that was presented in the first Merkel Great Alliance, in 2009. This was Germany’s response to the global financial crisis, which was writing in the German constitution to limit the deficit and religion. .
Poilizers Steinbrok, the Socialist Democratic Finance Minister, was the main character in this. Merkel obtained most of the remaining European Union member states to agree to similar debt brakes. This was completely catastrophic, both for Germany and the rest of Europe, because it is a limited investment that is needed in everything from infrastructure to education to defense.
I remember all of this, because the good thing that may come out of the big alliance that we likely faces after the elections at the end of February is to get rid of debt brakes.
How, specifically, do you see the decisions you made about the proximity of Russia?
There was consensus in the West – which was particularly strong in Germany, but was also shared throughout Europe and even in the United States – that the economic bond that you had with China and Russia, the more they became. ” I think the Europeans believed this more than the Americans, and I think inside Europe believes that more. Thus the German version of this, which was especially extremist, was called “change through trade”. China and Russia will make stakeholders responsible for international systems, but will also push them towards democracy. After the Russian annexation of the Crimea, in 2014, to the further return to Putin’s sermons in 2007, you can see that this did not happen, but the Germans really dug in this.
After the Crimea, although Merkel was widely praised due to the European Union’s inherited sanctions against Russia in response to Russian annexation. In fact, I remember that people who talk about how Germany destroyed, after 2014, in a geopolitical awakening and had all its illusions about Russia, and I have now adopted a very difficult approach embodied by these economic sanctions, which were actually very limited. Meanwhile, Merkel closed the debate about any kind of military response to Russian measures in Ukraine. Obama was president, and he was trying to start a discussion about whether we should arm the Ukrainians, and Merkel closed it immediately.
Perhaps more importantly, what happens after that is that Merkel is pushing forward with the creation of Nord Stream 2 [a natural-gas pipeline running between Russia and Germany]. In fact, part of its response to the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula is to double this interconnection between energy with Russia. I think it was still in a state of this idea that this was a way to limit the conflict with Russia. I think there is also a certain amount of ridicule, because this means cheap gas for German companies, and Merkel was in the pocket of large German companies.
