Transatlantic trepidation: Europe reacts to the new Reagan presidency – archive, 1981 | Ronald Reagan

Transatlantic Panic

by John Palmer In Brussels
January 22, 1981

In Europe, the inauguration of any contemporary American president has not been viewed with such ambiguity as the inauguration of Mr. Trump Ronald Reagan. Behind the official words of welcome and delegations of support for the administration, the United States’ European allies harbor serious doubts about the future of US-European relations.

Western attitudes Europe The view of a “strong” United States has always been contradictory – but rarely more so than today. On the one hand, most governments are keen to see Washington pursue a more consistent and self-confident international foreign policy. On the other hand, the Europeans are not willing to return to the client-state relationship that arose in the immediate postwar period when the United States was clearly in control.

The Europeans criticized the Carter administration for its indecision and inconsistency, but remained reluctant to conclude that US power, not just the US presidency, was in decline. Doing so meant asking themselves questions about the longer-term direction of European foreign and defense policy, to which no one had – or still has – any reliable answers. The almost universal assumption in European capitals is that after a short “honeymoon” period, serious frictions will arise between the United States and the European members of NATO on defense policy, and with the Common Market on foreign and perhaps trade policy. Some NATO strategists even fear that arguments over arms spending targets as well as the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles will weaken the alliance during a period of potentially dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union.

In fact, the dispute over cruises, contrary to previous expectations, may be more painful than the well-publicized transatlantic split over increased defense spending. The next US Secretary of Defense, Dr Caspar WeinbergerHe recently said that he is “not addicted to goals,” in an apparent retreat from Washington’s insistence that the Europeans must achieve the goal of a 5% annual increase, after inflation, in arms spending over the next four or five years.

The economic recession has made this goal “ineffective” for most European NATO countries in the same way that Reagan’s promise to simultaneously increase US arms spending by 7% next year, while cutting taxes and reducing the deficit, would make it “ineffective” for most European countries in NATO. The federal budget is meaningless. .

On the other hand, the Europeans do not like what they hear about Reagan’s position on renegotiation The second saltEspecially the assumption that Washington may not even want to broach the issue with Moscow for another six months. Most European governments feel that this delay carries a very high risk that the entire agreement will be derailed. They believe that already widespread opposition to the deployment of cruise and nuclear Pershing missiles in Western Europe will be further emboldened by any “slowdown” by Washington on SALT 2.

Even those European diplomats who reject Dr Henry KissingerRecent criticism of European attempts to develop its own initiative on the Middle East acknowledges that he was right to ask whether, in the long term, Europe could have a common defense policy with the United States without at the same time having a common defense policy. Foreign policy.

For now, the Europeans intend to have it both ways: insist on their own foreign policy ideas independently of Washington, while maintaining a common defense policy in NATO.

But the more Europeans have to determine their future foreign and even defense policies, on their own and not with the Americans in NATO, the greater the risks of transatlantic misunderstandings and even conflicts.

European ambivalence in dealing with American foreign and defense policy is matched by concerns about the direction of economic and trade policies. They will clearly postpone final judgment until they see what the policy actually looks like and who will be on the new policy-making team. Exaggerated hopes are being placed on figures such as the new Foreign Minister, Mr. Hashem Al HaigTo prevent alliance frictions from developing into something more serious. But most Europeans have a gut feeling that Reagan’s four years as president will put serious pressure on NATO and will challenge Europeans to think and act increasingly for themselves.

Schmidt welcomes the new management

From our correspondent in Frankfurt
January 31, 1981

As relations between Bonn and Washington improved, the West German government looked forward to close consultations with the Reagan administration. Counselor Schmidt He told parliament in Bonn yesterday that the prospects for reaching a comprehensive concept based on the division of labor with the Americans have never been better.

He praised US Secretary of State, General Haig, for his “courageous words” regarding the defense efforts made by America’s allies, especially West Germany. He wanted to thank General Haig because Boone had not always been treated that way by Washington.

Schmidt expressed his satisfaction that the Americans ignored the “3% argument” in the debate over defense efforts. NATO’s decision to increase defense spending by 3% annually was a continuing irritant in relations between Bonn and Washington during the final months of Carter’s presidency.

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher is scheduled to travel to Washington in early March for talks with General Hague. It will urge the Americans to maintain military parity with the Soviet Union.

He was adamant on the necessity of implementing NATO’s decision to deploy medium-range missiles in the West. He added: “Whoever questions this decision is questioning the alliance.”

Neutron bomb plan raises a storm in Europe

by Patrick KeightleyDiplomatic correspondent
February 6, 1981

The leaders of Britain, Sweden and West Germany yesterday issued warnings that the use of a neutron bomb would lower the threshold for all-out nuclear war.

In the House of Commons, Michael Foot described the statement by President Reagan’s Defense Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, as “a very dangerous suggestion” that he was considering producing an “enhanced radiation weapon” for use by US and NATO forces. The other. In Europe. Foot asked the Prime Minister: “Don’t you agree that one aspect that would be very dangerous for everyone in Western Europe is that it could lower the nuclear threshold level?”

Thatcher said the weapon would be designed to deal with “massive concentrations” of tanks in the Soviet Army and other Warsaw Pact forces. It was “highly unlikely that there would be a need to place such weapons here.”
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